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In most systematic work by economists on the political economy of trade pol- 
icy, the primary causal  mechanism  is the  competing  demands  for different 
trade policies by various domestic pressure groups, who are motivated by eco- 
nomic self-interest. I  The supply side is modeled quite simply. Politicians also 
pursue  their  economic self-interest by  seeking to be  reelected  and, conse- 
quently,  supply the trade policies  desired by  the  group  or groups  who,  by 
providing votes and campaign contributions,  give them the best opportunity 
for being reelected. This framework has led to a substantial body of theoreti- 
cal and empirical work that has significantly improved our understanding of 
trade policy. 
This model does, however, mainly emphasize the “demand’ side since the 
demands of pressure groups are weighted  to determine the equilibrium level 
of protection. In the typical political economy model of  economists, the sup- 
plying of  particular  forms of  trade policy by  politicians,  bureaucrats,  and, 
more generally,  the state,  as part of their efforts to promote such collective 
goals as national security, is ruled out. Moreover, voters are portrayed as re- 
sponding favorably  only to policies  that  promote  their short-run  economic 
self-interests and not to the pursuit of such foreign policy goals. In this paper, 
we seek to show that this political economy framework is too narrow and to 
illustrate the fundamental role of the state in some circumstances by focusing 
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on trade policy-making  in the United States and Taiwan in the post-Second 
World War era.2 
With the end of the Second World War, both the government of the United 
States and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) experienced major 
crises. In both cases, the appearance of an external threat caused a fundamen- 
tal reassessment of the structural and institutional foundations of the ~tate.~  In 
both cases, the governments attempted to restructure the politics of  trade pol- 
icy  by  attaching  trade policy  to broader  political  goals.  In both  cases, the 
governments used their increased authority to pursue broadly liberal trade pol- 
icies.  Finally,  in  both  cases the deterioration of the  regimes  erected  in the 
postwar era has led to uncertainty about the sustainability of the commitment 
to a liberal trading order and greater unpredictability. Section 1  1.1 of the pa- 
per discusses the development of U.S. trade policy in general and its policy 
toward Taiwan in particular;  section  1 1.2 discusses the development  of  Tai- 
wan’s trade policy in general and its policy toward the United States in partic- 
ular; and  section  11.3 summarizes our conclusions from the comparison of 
trade policy in the two countries. 
11.1  External Threat, State Autonomy, and the Evolution of U.S. 
’bade Policy, 1945-91 
1 1.1.1  Introduction 
U.S. trade policies toward the Republic of  China over the last fifty years 
illustrate very clearly the key shift in U.S. international economic policy  in 
the post-World  War I1 period, namely, the change from a pattern of policy- 
making largely shaped by foreign policy factors until the late 1960s (specifi- 
cally, national security considerations) to one influenced mainly by domestic 
economic conditions. 
Four features  of  this  basic  change are particularly  relevant  in  analyzing 
U.S.-Taiwan  trading  relations.  First,  there  has  been  a  shift by  the  United 
States from an emphasis on reducing trade barriers in the world economy to 
achieving “fair” international trade. Today one frequently hears U.S. political 
leaders calling for “a level playing field,” for foreign markets to be open as 
much as are U.S. markets, and for U.S.  fair trade laws to be vigorously  en- 
forced. In recent years, there have been numerous charges of  unfair trading 
practices  against Taiwan by  U.S. officials and leaders in the private  sector, 
2. In emphasizing the supply side, we recognize that voters and other political groups usually 
must approve of  the policies initiated by the government if these policies are to be implemented 
successfully. The point  we  stress is that the government,  rather than private pressure groups, 
sometimes initiates policy proposals and plays an important role in persuading the public of their 
merit. 
3. The notion that external  threats have been  a significant force in  the development of  the 
nation-state is an old one. As examples of the large literature on this issue, see Hintze (1979, 
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including dumping and government subsidization, piracy of intellectual prop- 
erty rights, violation of worker rights, the maintenance of export requirements 
for foreign direct  investors,  and the manipulation of the  exchange rate  for 
export-promoting purposes. 
A second major modification  in U.S. trade policy is the greater use of uni- 
lateral and bilateral (or plurilateral) means, in contrast to multilateral mecha- 
nisms, to achieve its trading goals. For example, the number of antidumping 
and countervailing duties imposed unilaterally  by the United States on other 
countries, including Taiwan, has increased dramatically since the early 1980s. 
Taiwan and other developing countries have also been pressured through such 
new measures as Section 301 of the 1974  Trade Act and Super-301 of the 1988 
Trade Act. In recent years, the United States has also utilized bilateral negoti- 
ations as a means of resolving trade disputes with such countries as Taiwan to 
a much greater extent than in the early postwar period. 
A third noteworthy characteristic of the “new” U.S. trade policy is a much 
greater willingness to use  discriminatory  nontariff measures,  in contrast to 
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs, as a means of holding down imports. The 
orderly marketing agreement (OMAs) with Taiwan and Korea on nonrubber 
footwear put into effect in 1977, the more restrictive bilateral pact on exports 
of Taiwanese textiles and apparel to the United States agreed on in 1986, and 
the 1986 voluntary restraint agreement reached with Taiwan and Japan on ma- 
chine tools are good examples. 
The last change in U.S. trade policy that we wish to emphasize is the much 
greater role taken  in recent years by  Congress  in shaping trade policy. Al- 
though the Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate international 
commerce, beginning in  1934 Congress has authorized the president to enter 
into negotiations with other countries for the purpose of  reducing  tariffs by 
some maximum percentage (e.g., 50 percent) on a reciprocal basis. The pres- 
ident could decide which duties to cut. For many years after World War 11, the 
president took  the initiative in  seeking additional tariff-cutting  authority  for 
new multilateral rounds of  duty reductions and used his influence to secure 
congressional  consent  for  this  additional  authority.  However,  this  pattern 
changed drastically,  beginning with the Trade Act of  1974. In that year, the 
administration proposed new authority for another GATT-sponsored multilat- 
eral round of trade negotiations, but Congress significantly altered the presi- 
dent’s proposal. Since then, Congress has played the key role in writing trade 
legislation. In the 1988 Trade Act, for example, the role of the administration 
was reduced to one of trying to prevent the inclusion of some provisions that 
it strongly opposed. Congress has “taken charge” of U.S. trade policy in re- 
cent years, although the president still has considerable influence through veto 
power. 
In  an effort to understand better the difficulties faced by  Taiwan and other 
newly industrializing nations in recent years in their economic relations with 
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first caused U.S. trade policy to be largely shaped by foreign policy consider- 
ations and then led to domestic economic considerations becoming the major 
force influencing trade policy. This analysis is undertaken  in section  11.1.2. 
Section 1 1.1.3 then examines the various trade policy actions initiated by the 
United  States against Taiwan over the last five years or so. Section  11.1.4 
discusses  specific trade policy actions brought by the  United  States against 
Taiwan in recent years. 
1 1.1.2  The Brief Period of U.S. Hegemony after World War I1 
In  understanding  U.S.  trade  policy  during  the  early  post-World  War  I1 
years, it is important to emphasize that the United States was thrust into the 
leadership position of the non-Communist states rather than actively seeking 
it. Control of the three key international economic institutions agreed on even 
before the end of the war, namely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
International Bank for Reconstruction  and Development (the World  Bank), 
and the ill-fated International Trade Organization, which became the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is based on the notion of collective 
leadership  by  a  small  number  of  industrial  powers.  U.S. political  leaders 
wished to participate  actively  in the process of  creating a prosperous world 
economy, however.  For example, in a 26 March  1945 message  to Congress 
asking for an additional 50 percent duty-cutting authority, President Roosevelt 
stated, “If the economic foundations of peace are to be as secure as the politi- 
cal foundations,  it is clear that this effort [the trade liberalization process as- 
sociated  with  the  reciprocal  trade  agreements  program]  must be  continued 
vigorously.” The $3.75 billion U.S. loan to the United Kingdom in  1946 is a 
financial illustration of this commitment. 
Two developments prevented the new international organizations from op- 
erating  in  the  manner  intended  by  their founders.  The first  was  the  much 
greater economic destruction in the major countries than had been anticipated, 
while the second was the emergence of  a new struggle for political and eco- 
nomic domination  in the world.  Restoring  prewar production levels in such 
victorious countries as the United Kingdom and France as well as in countries 
such as Germany and Japan, who were on the losing side, proved to be a much 
more difficult task than imagined. The resources of  the World Bank and the 
IMF were much too small to meet the reconstructioii and balance-of-payments 
problems of these countries, to say nothing of  the development  needs of  the 
less developed nations.  Only the United  States, whose industrial capacity at 
the end of  the  war was much larger than  at the beginning,  was capable of 
meeting even the most essential needs of these countries. Most U.S. political 
leaders argued that it was necessary  to assist these countries to ensure the 
economic as well as the political benefits of the victory of the Allies. 
Another, more compelling reason why the United States assumed a leader- 
ship role in the immediate postwar period was the political threat posed by the 
Soviet Union.  The expansion  of  Soviet political  influence  into Eastern  Eu- 311  Political Economy of U.S .-Taiwanese Trade 
rope, Manchuria, and northern Korea and the threat of  Communist takeover 
in such nations as Turkey and Greece endangered the political benefits of the 
military victory. 
As those political  scientists who stress the importance of the state in ex- 
plaining international  relations  (e.g., Krasner  1978, 1984; Evans, Ruesche- 
meyer, and Skocpol 1985) point out, some political and economic actions of 
political leaders cannot, it seems, be explained in terms of the popular politi- 
cal economy model in which politicians,  who wish to remain in office, shape 
their policies to reflect the interests of various pressure groups, who provide 
the funds and votes needed to ensure a high probability of reelection.  Some 
policies, especially those related to national security, are taken well before the 
various political pressure groups are fully aware of  the nature of  the problem 
and have determined what policy action furthers their self-interests. The chief 
executive is invariably given the prime responsibility for initiating such deci- 
sions and, by the very nature of such matters, is provided information needed 
for decision making at a much earlier time than the general public. As Nelson 
(1990) states, the nature of these executive decisions and the extent to which 
they are accepted by others depends on the degree of the government’s auton- 
omy from direct social pressure, the degree of  unity among government offi- 
cials, and the degree of legitimacy granted to the government by society. 
President Truman’s first effort to counter the perceived threat by the Soviet 
Union to peace and stability was to provide military and economic assistance 
to Greece and Turkey, where there was a strong possibility of  a Communist 
takeover.  The president  and  his  secretary  of  state, George  Marshall, also 
moved  on the  economic front by  initiating  a massive  foreign  aid program 
aimed at strengthening Western  European countries so that they could better 
resist internal and external pressures from the Communists. At the same time, 
the United States began to enter into a series of defensive military alliances, 
such as the Atlantic Treaty, with countries around the world in order to carry 
out a policy of containment of  Soviet expansion. These policies toward the 
Soviet Union were accepted by leaders of both the Republican and the Dem- 
ocratic parties. 
U.S. policy toward  the Communists in China was quite different, at least 
until the Korean War. The decision had been made in World War I1 to concen- 
trate on achieving victory in Western Europe first. Furthermore, the plan se- 
lected to defeat the Japanese was one involving island-hopping procedures led 
by U.S. forces rather than one based on defeating the Japanese forces in China 
and Korea and then invading Japan. Consequently, military and economic aid 
to the Nationalist government in China was modest in comparison with other 
theaters of  operation, The view also seemed to be widely held  in the U.S. 
government that corruption in Chiang Kai-shek’s government was widespread 
and that aid from the United States was not effectively used (Koen 1974). 
As it became apparent that the Communists were likely to be victorious in 
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the U.S.  government  to cease further military assistance to the  Nationalist 
government and to try to reach an accommodation with the Chinese Commu- 
nist~.~  After the victory on the mainland  of Mao Tse-tung’s forces in  1949, 
there were also apparently a number of  important officials in the executive 
branch who wanted to recognize the new regime. But there was also an influ- 
ential group in Congress and in the private sector, the so-called China Lobby, 
who  strongly  opposed  any  accommodation  efforts.  President  Truman  did, 
however, state in January  1950 that the U.S.  government would not provide 
military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Taiwan. 
The Korean War,  which started in June  1950 with  the invasion of South 
Korea by North  Korean forces, and especially the entrance of the People’s 
Republic of  China into the war after UN forces had  reached the border of 
North Korea and China, dramatically changed U.S. policy toward the Repub- 
lic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The president took the lead under UN sponsor- 
ship in resisting this aggression by committing U.S. forces to combat in Korea 
and ordering the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait to protect Tai- 
wan from invasion by Red China. A large-scale program of both military and 
economic aid to Taiwan was also initiated in the latter part of  1950. The shift 
in policy was readily accepted by most voters,  and Red China was lumped 
with the Soviet Union as a hostile power. 
This  incident  again  illustrates the  autonomy  of  the  state in  international 
economic matters under some circumstances as well as the theme that inter- 
national  economic policy  is sometimes shaped by  foreign  policy considera- 
tions. However, political pressure from the China Lobby also quite likely led 
to more economic assistance than  otherwise would have been forthcoming. 
This economic aid lasted until 1965. 
As far as trade policy is concerned, Taiwan did not receive any special treat- 
ment in the early postwar years. However, since part of the U.S. strategy of 
strengthening non-Communist  countries  was to engage in  trade-liberalizing 
negotiations through the GATT process, and since developing countries were 
not required to make reciprocal cuts in their duties, Taiwan and other devel- 
oping countries enjoyed improved  access to U.S. markets without having to 
open up their own markets.  Beginning  in  1976, developing countries were 
also given  duty-free  treatment  in  the United  States on many  manufactured 
goods. 
One important  indirect U.S.  influence on Taiwan’s trade policy  operated 
through the technical assistance provided  by the U.S. AID Mission.  As the 
easy phase of  the  import-substitution  approach  adopted in  the early  1950s 
came to an end in the mid-1950s and growth began to slow down, U.S. AID 
officials pressed for liberalization of the trade and exchange rate regimes and 
for greater emphasis  on private  enterprise as the  source of  growth (Jacoby 
4. This statement and the ones that follow are based on material in Koen (1974) and Davis and 
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1966, chap. 10; Ho 1978, chap. 10). Financial aid provided  under the pro- 
gram was also important in facilitating this shift in policy. 
U.S. hegemony in economic matters manifested itself in many ways in the 
late 1940s and the 1950s. The dollar became the main currency used in mak- 
ing international payments and replaced gold as the main means of  holding 
reserves  for balance-of-payments  purposes.  Between  1946 and  1949, U.S. 
exports were about twice as large as U.S. imports as a so-called dollar short- 
age emerged after the war, requiring the imposition of exchange controls in 
most countries. The U.S. share of total exports of the industrial countries rose 
to 35.2 percent in  1953, compared to 25.6 percent in 1938 (Baldwin 1958). 
In contrast, the combined share of Germany and Japan fell from 24.0 percent 
to 11.4 percent between those years. 
U.S. economic dominance in the early postwar years was based to some 
extent on technological leadership but, more fundamentally,  on the fact that 
the industrial capacity of most of its international competitors had been de- 
stroyed to a considerable extent or become obsolete. These countries still pos- 
sessed the human skills and organizational abilities to restore their industrial 
capacities and adopt new technologies, however. With the help of the United 
States through its aid program, most industrial countries regained their prewar 
export shares by  1960 and were able to lift exchange controls by that date, 
The U.S. export share had fallen from its 35.2 percent level in 1953 to 29.4 
percent in 1959. For manufacturing alone the decline was from 29.4 percent 
in  1953 to 18.7 percent in 1959. By 1971, the U.S. share of world exports of 
manufactures had fallen to 13.4 percent. 
Another indication of  the end of  U.S.  economic hegemony was growing 
dissatisfaction  with  the  international  monetary  system based on the dollar, 
Countries’ unwillingness  to hold  an increasing  supply of  dollars led to the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s and the introduction 
of a flexible exchange rate system. 
11.1.3  U.S. Trade Policy after Hegemony 
By the late 1960s it became clear that U.S. dominance in the trade area had 
come to an end. There was a sharp increase in import penetration  ratios in 
such important  product lines as wool and man-made textile products,  foot- 
wear,  automobiles,  steel, and  electrical  consumers  goods  (e.g.,  television 
sets, radios, and phonographs). In view of this increasing import competition, 
Congress and important parts of  the private sector were less willing to open 
U.S. markets for foreign policy reasons. Furthermore, it was apparent that the 
dangers of Communist expansion from both  internal and external takeovers 
had decreased greatly from the late 1940s and 1950s. The aid and trade poli- 
cies had been highly successful not only in strengthening the non-Communist 
nations so that they could better resist Communist expansionary pressures but 
also in turning some of these nations into very effective economic competitors 
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When, for example, President Johnson proposed a new trade bill in  1968 
extending the duty-cutting authority granted for the Kennedy Round of trade 
negotiations until 1970 and eliminating the American selling price (ASP) pro- 
vision of U.S. trade law, not only was the request rejected, but the administra- 
tion had to work hard to prevent the passage of legislation that would establish 
import quotas in such sectors as textiles,  dairy products,  steel, leather,  and 
petrole~m.~  However,  under the threat that Congress would pass legislation 
mandating import quotas for steel, the administration did negotiate a volun- 
tary export  restraint program  with  European  and Japanese  steel producers. 
Another general quota bill  was approved by the two key committees in the 
House and Senate in  1970 and failed only because of  a threat by some free 
trade-oriented  members of Congress to filibuster against it on the floor of the 
Senate. The major national labor organization, the AFL-CIO, which had sup- 
ported a liberal trade policy since the early 1930s, joined the ranks of  those 
supporting this protectionist bill. Arguing, as the 1962 Trade Expansion  Act 
did, that a major purpose of continuing multilateral trade liberalization is “to 
prevent Communist economic penetration” was no longer effective in persuad- 
ing Congress to go along with the president’s goal of  using trade policy for 
foreign policy purposes. 
Thus, when for the first time in the postwar period the United States began 
to face significant import competition over a wide range of commodities,  it 
responded by rejecting increased protectionism.  Instead, a new theme began 
to gain support, especially within the private sector and in Congress, namely, 
that unfair trade practices by foreign countries were the source of most of the 
competitive problems of U.S.  industry. When in 1973 the Nixon administra- 
tion requested broad authority to engage in reciprocal tariff-reducing negotia- 
tions and conclude international agreements on nontariff trade barriers, Con- 
gress completely reshaped the proposal, making its objective the tightening of 
GATT provisions  dealing  with  unfair trade practices.  These covered unfair 
practices leading both to increased U.S. imports and to reduced U.S. exports. 
Among the purposes of the legislation that emerged, namely, the Trade Act of 
1974, are “to harmonize, reduce, and eliminate barriers to trade on a basis 
which assures substantially equivalent competitive opportunities for the com- 
merce of the United States” and “to establish fairness and equity in interna- 
tional trading relations, including reform of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade .” 
In the GATT multilateral trade negotiations that followed the Tokyo Round, 
six major GATT codes were agreed on, covering customs valuation practices, 
government procurement policies, import licensing procedures, technical bar- 
5. Under ASP,  imports  of  benzenoid chemicals, rubber-soled footwear, canned clams, and 
certain woolen knit gloves were valued for duty-levying purposes, not at the export value of  the 
goods (as stipulated under the GATT), but at the selling price of  similar goods produced in the 
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riers  to  trade,  subsidies  and  countervailing duties, and dumping  and  anti- 
dumping duties. Tariffs on industrial products were also cut another 30 percent 
on the average. 
The U.S. objective of bringing cases based on the new codes before GATT 
panels and gradually building up a body of “case law” that would curtail un- 
fair practices by  foreign countries did not work out as planned.  In order to 
obtain agreement  among the major participants,  the codes were phrased in 
such a general and, sometimes, seemingly contradictory manner that the pan- 
els did not reach the strict decisions desired by U.S. trade negotiators. Other 
aspects of the dispute settlements procedures, especially those relating to the 
ability of  a single GATT member to prevent adoption of  a panel report and to 
the ability of a member to refrain from implementing a panel’s decision, even 
if adopted, also proved to be very disappointing to the United States. 
There was  one feature  of  the  U.S.  legislation  implementing  the  Tokyo 
Round codes that has proved to be very important in shaping U.S. trade pol- 
icy. Congress insisted that the administration of the antidumping and counter- 
vailing duty laws be taken away from the Treasury Department, and the pres- 
ident agreed to shift these responsibilities to the Commerce Department. This 
change illustrates how  institutional changes can sometimes have significant 
effects on economic policy. Because the secretary of the Treasury deals exten- 
sively with international financial matters, such as exchange rate and interna- 
tional tax policy, he generally must be acceptable to international business and 
financial groups,  who tend to want as little regulation of trade and financial 
flows as possible.  Consequently, the Treasury secretary usually  favors a lib- 
eral trading system. The secretary of commerce, in contrast, is more oriented 
toward  domestic  business  interests and is more likely  to have protectionist 
leanings. 
Although U.S.  officials were disappointed with the way the Tokyo codes 
were administered by the GATT, they still emphasized the multilateral route 
as the main means of achieving their trade objectives. Under the urging of the 
United States, a GATT ministerial meeting was held in November  1982. At 
this meeting, the United States proposed a new round of negotiations to deal 
not only with such well-known issues as agriculture, safeguards, and dispute 
settlement procedures but also with new issues involving liberalizing trade in 
services, preventing trade-related investment measures from distorting trade, 
and expanding trade in high-technology  products.  Unfortunately,  partly  be- 
cause of inadequate preparation  and consultation with other participants by 
the United States, the meeting was a failure, with no new round of trade ne- 
gotiations being agreed on. 
There is considerable evidence to indicate that this failure marked a turning 
point in U.S.  trade policy (Richardson  1991). U.S.  trade policy officials de- 
cided to emphasize to a greater extent bilateral and plurilateral negotiations as 
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don the multilateral approach. In particular,  they decided to use some of  the 
broad powers that Congress had previously granted the president to undertake 
more bilateral negotiations with such countries as Japan and the newly indus- 
trializing nations in order to gain greater access to their markets for U.S. ex- 
ports and to begin to negotiate special regional agreements. 
Significant macroeconomic  developments also emerged in the  1980s that 
provided  additional incentives for pursuing nonmultilateral means of achiev- 
ing trade policy goals. A massive trade deficit emerged in the 1980s with the 
excess of merchandise imports over exports rising from $25 billion in 1980 to 
$160 billion  in  1987. The causes  are so well known  that they  need  not be 
spelled out in detail here. In essence, the main cause was the rapid rise in 
government expenditures relative to tax revenues as the Reagan  administra- 
tion  increased  defense  spending significantly while  reducing tax rates.  The 
rise in interest rates as the government bid for funds and the Federal Reserve 
pursued a tight monetary policy to control inflation attracted a substantial in- 
flow of foreign funds, thereby bidding up the price of the dollar in terms of 
foreign currencies by about 55 percent in real terms between 1980 and 1985. 
The drop in private savings in the United States and the elimination of certain 
controls over foreign investment by the Japanese government contributed to 
the dollar appreciation. 
The dollar appreciation made both U.S. exports much more expensive and 
imports from foreign countries much cheaper. The outcome was the massive 
trade deficit. Not only were industries that traditionally  found it difficult to 
compete against foreign producers hurt badly, but many sectors that were usu- 
ally highly competitive were faced with profit problems. Since the administra- 
tion seemed unwilling to deal with the complaints from import-competing and 
export-oriented  industries,  these  sectors turned to Congress for assistance. 
Raising taxes  and reducing  government  expenditures  were  not  popular,  so 
more and more members of Congress  and business leaders began  to blame 
foreigners  for  their  problems.  In  particular,  they  claimed  that  unfair trade 
practices by  foreign producers  caused imports to be excessive and reduced 
U.S. export opportunities significantly. 
With its tightening of the countervailing duty and antidumping laws, spe- 
cial provisions for the steel and wine industries, authorization of a free trade 
agreement with Israel, and emphasis on reducing barriers to trade in services, 
the 1984 Trade Act was a product of an environment of congressional dissat- 
isfaction  with  the operation  of  the  fair trade  laws and the  administration’s 
frustration with the multilateral approach. The 1988 Trade and Competitive- 
ness Act is also a manifestation  of  the dissatisfaction by Congress with the 
way members of Congress perceived the trading system to be operating. Pres- 
sure on the president  to retaliate  against unfair trade actions was increased 
through the strengthening of Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and the enact- 
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to identify priority countries in terms of having policies that constitute signif- 
icant barriers to  U.S. exports and then to undertake negotiations with these 
countries aimed at eliminating or reducing these barriers. The countervailing 
duty and antidumping laws were further tightened. 
The administration did succeed in obtaining authority to negotiate multilat- 
erally on the various new and old issues they had raised in the  1982 GATT 
ministerial meeting, plus several more.  Most of  the countries who had op- 
posed the  1982 initiative agreed in  1986 to undertake new multilateral nego- 
tiations,  the Uruguay  Round. Their acceptance of such negotiations  appears 
to have been influenced by a fear that the United States would use unilateral, 
bilateral,  and plurilateral means to achieve their objectives more than these 
other countries wished to see. 
11,1.4 
Taiwan and such other countries as Korea and Brazil have taken the brunt 
of the aggressive unilateralism and bilateralism practiced by the United States 
against developing countries in recent years with regard to trade rnattex6  The 
elimination of the zero-duty status of Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singa- 
pore in 1988 is a good example of the efforts to curtail imports from the indus- 
trializing developing countries.  Another important example is the stricter en- 
forcement of the countervailing duty and antidumping laws. After the Trade 
Act of  1979, these cases increased dramatically. In  1980 alone,  U.S. indus- 
tries filed petitions leading to sixty-eight countervailing duty (CVD) cases and 
thirty-seven antidumping (AD) cases. Between 1 January 1980 and the end of 
1990, 313 CVD and 469 AD investigations were undertaken.  In this period, 
there were seven CVD and twenty-nine AD cases filed against Taiwan. The 
number of  CVD and AD cases  against Korea  were  seventeen  and  twenty- 
eight, respectively,  while the CVD and AD cases against Brazil  during this 
period  were thirty-six and twenty-five, respectively. The cases against these 
three countries constituted 76 percent of all CVD investigations against devel- 
oping countries and 41 percent of the AD investigations against these coun- 
tries. However, a statistical analysis of the economic factors influencing Inter- 
national  Trade  Commission  injury  determinations  in  these  cases  does  not 
indicate that Taiwan is being treated differently than other countries (Baldwin 
1991). 
Another import-reducing measure used against Taiwan that illustrates U.S. 
policy very well is the bilateral textile agreement reached in 1986. Imports of 
textiles into the United States that had been growing at about  15 percent an- 
nually were projected to increase at only about one-half of  1 percent under the 
U.S. Trade Actions against Taiwan 
6. Much of  the following account of  trade policy actions is taken from various issues of the 
weekly Inrernational Trade Reporter published by  the Bureau of  National Affairs, Washington, 
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two-year agreement. In announcing the agreement, the U.S. negotiator stated 
that it was only for two years because Taiwan maintained high duties on tex- 
tiles. He also hinted that, if these were lowered, the growth rate of  imports 
from Taiwan might be increased.  In  1987, the agreement was extended for 
another year after Taiwan did cut its textile tariffs. 
Much of the pressure has been directed at further opening Taiwanese mar- 
kets to U.S. exports. Section 301 has been effectively used for this purpose. 
For example, in one instance, President Reagan stated in 1986 he would retal- 
iate under Section 301 as long as Taiwan maintained  a valuation process for 
duty-levying purposes that was based on an administrative valuation of goods 
rather than on their actual export prices. Taiwan quickly changed its customs 
valuation procedures (it had promised earlier to do so but had not met the date 
initially set), and the case was dropped. In 1991, a Section 301 case covering 
distilled  spirits was dropped after Taiwan agreed to open this market to the 
United States and the European Community. The threat of  a 301 action also 
hastened the opening of the Taiwanese market for beer, wine, and cigarettes 
to U.  S.  exporters. 
The first case brought  under  Section  307  of  the  1984 Trade Act, which 
aimed  at  preventing  countries  from  imposing  export  performance  require- 
ments, was brought against Taiwan in  1986. A Japanese automobile firm in- 
vesting in the country had been assigned an export requirement that U.S. ne- 
gotiators  thought  could  rise  from  12.5  percent  to  50  percent.  Taiwan 
responded by dropping this requirement. 
Using the threat of  retaliation,  the  United  States also pressed  Taiwan to 
tighten its laws protecting intellectual property  rights, to open its market for 
such services as insurance and construction,  and reduce its duties on various 
manufactured  and  agricultural  products.  U.S.  negotiators  have  praised  the 
country’s response on the intellectual property front but are still pressuring in 
the services area. Taiwan has significantly lowered its duties on many prod- 
ucts  in recent  years,  but the United  States would  like to see much  greater 
liberalization in agriculture. 
U.S. officials have also expressed dissatisfaction on many occasions with 
the exchange rate policy  of  Taiwan.  The global current account surplus of 
Taiwan reached  almost $14 billion  in  1987, and its export surplus with the 
United States in that year was over $15 billion. Rather than allowing the Tai- 
wanese dollar to appreciate, the monetary authorities increased their reserves 
holdings. These reached $65 billion in 1987 and made the country one of the 
largest holders of international reserves in the world. In response to U. S.  pres- 
sure, Taiwanese authorities have allowed their currency to appreciate some- 
what, but U.S. officials still believe the Taiwanese dollar to be significantly 
undervalued. 319  Political Economy of U.S.-Taiwanese Trade 
11.2  External Threat, State Building, and the Evolution of ROC 
Wade Policy 
1  1  .2.1  Introduction 
Where the U.S. government faced what might be thought of as an “identity 
crisis” in the immediate postwar years, the government of the ROC and the 
dominant  Kuomintang (KMT) party were threatened  with total destruction. 
From outside, the KMT was threatened by the Communist government of the 
Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), while inside it perceived a threat from the 
Taiwanese people, who had good reason to consider the KMT a foreign con- 
queror. An understanding of this situation, and of the lessons that the KMT 
drew from its failure on the mainland, is essential to understanding ROC eco- 
nomic policy-making.  Thus, before considering  the evolution of Taiwanese 
trade policy, we briefly discuss the broader political-economic context. 
11.2.2  The Foundations of State Autonomy in Postwar Taiwan 
With the collapse of the Ch’ing empire in 191  1, China entered a period of 
internal turmoil, the final outcome of  which is still unclear. In the immediate 
aftermath of  the revolution, central authority disappeared completely as war- 
lords established local authority that was politically unresponsive to the cen- 
ter. Following the Northern Expedition and the establishment of a new gov- 
ernment at Nanking by the KMT in  1927, and despite the brutality of their 
earlier purge of Communists, there was a brief period of high expectations.’ 
Unfortunately,  corruption,  incompetence,  foreign  invasion,  and  civil  war 
combined to render such expectations unachievable. While its failures in po- 
litical discipline and social mobilization are of considerable interest in them- 
selves, their relation to the economic policies (or lack thereof) of  the KMT 
during the Nanking decade are of more immediate concern. 
The Nationalist  government in Nanking was  in a constant  state of  fiscal 
crisis. On the one hand, the ROC faced the substantial costs of defense against 
foreign aggression and suppression of  domestic rebellion. On the other hand, 
as part of the attempt to buy the allegiance of the KMT “warlords,” the Nank- 
ing government  ceded the proceeds  of  most of the land tax to the regional 
governments. Furthermore, until  1930, the revenues from customs  and the 
salt tax were directly controlled by foreign governments. As a result, the cen- 
tral government relied heavily on foreign borrowing and virtually expropria- 
tory taxation  of the urban formal sector. Even after the government  gained 
control of  customs and salt tax revenues, the need to fund its borrowing costs 
as well as its military costs led the government to pursue a policy of revenue 
maximization via import and export taxes rather than a development-oriented 
policy of infant-industry protection. Thus, although the KMT was rhetorically 
7. For excellent treatments of the KMT on the mainland, see Eastman (1974, 1984). 320  Robert E. Baldwin and Douglas Nelson 
committed  to industrial  development, and although  its policies of  unifying 
both money and weights and measures did lower the transaction costs of busi- 
ness, it  is difficult to avoid  the conclusion  that  the overall effects of  KMT 
economic policy were negative.* 
It is particularly notable that, although the KMT (and Chiang Kai-shek in 
particular) commanded broad support during the war with Japan, the end of 
the war and the emergence of  civil war with the Communists  revealed  that 
virtually  no significant segment of  society strongly supported  the National- 
ists. In the cities, while attempts to mobilize urban labor had effectively ended 
with the anti-Communist purges of 1927, shared anti-Communism was insuf- 
ficient to overcome the fundamental distrust between Chinese capitalists and 
the KMT, as Coble (1980) demonstrates. In the countryside, land reform, like 
tax reform, was impossible  if  provincial  “warlords”  were to be kept in the 
Nationalist coalition. This left the peasants to the Communists without devel- 
oping any strong commitment on the part of the rural elites. Thus, in retro- 
spect, it is hardly surprising that, with the removal of the external threat, the 
KMT’s popular support and its capacity to resist the Communist  forces col- 
lapsed. 
With the end of  the war in the Pacific, Taiwan, which had been ceded to 
Japan in  1895 (making it Japan’s first colony), was retroceded to the ROC in 
1945. As a colony, although it was economically and politically dominated by 
Japan, Taiwan experienced considerable social and economic development. In 
an effort to impose order and increase agricultural productivity,  the Japanese 
authorities undertook a cadastral  survey followed by a modest land reform, 
the introduction of  improved production  techniques,  and the organization of 
farmers into farmers’ associations.  In the more urban areas, the Japanese ex- 
tended education, developed the processing and shipping industries to support 
the export of  rice and sugar, and, with the onset of  the Second World War, 
began to develop heavy industry for export to the Japanese market and a wide 
range of import-substituting goods. Although Taiwan sustained heavy damage 
toward the end of  the war, it was probably the most agriculturally and indus- 
trially advanced province in China.9 Furthermore, it was an economy with a 
strong orientation to modem market relations. 
When the Nationalist  government took control of Taiwan in  1945, it was 
not with the expectation that it might be a safe haven. Thus, instead of moving 
to integrate Taiwan politically and economically with the mainland, the ROC 
treated Taiwan as captured, hostile territory.  Politically, the Japanese admin- 
8. For a useful review of the basic economic data of  the period  1912-49,  see Feuerwerker 
(1977). For a more systematic discussion of economic performance in these years, see Hou (1965) 
and Young (1971). The negative effects of  KMT monetary policy are too well known to require 
additional comment. 
9. Amsden (1979) and Gold (1986, chap. 3) provide useful short accounts of  the effects of 
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istration was replaced by a Mainlander administration, and a nascent reform 
movement was brutally repressed (Mendel 1970).  lo Economically, ROC/KMT 
officials systematically -dismantled what remained of the Japanese/Taiwanese 
industrial plant and seized the stocks of sugar and rice, generally for shipment 
to the mainland. Neither the political nor the economic actions of the ROC/ 
KMT officials appear to have been intended to lay the foundation for complete 
economic integration  or even efficient colonial  administration. On the con- 
trary, contemporary accounts stress their corruption, vindictiveness, and bru- 
tality (Kerr 1965; Peng 1972). That is, the ROC/KMT acted in Taiwan more 
or less as it did in the rest of China. The result was that, to use Gold’s (1986, 
49) felicitous description, “Taiwan’s formal retrocession to China on October 
25, 1945 inaugurated a period of rapid underdevelopment.” 
By the end of 1949, the ROC and the KMT were clearly faced with destruc- 
tion by  the Red Army. The Nationalists had been steadily pushed back and 
were preparing to retreat to Taiwan to make their last stand. Contrary to the 
politically  self-serving rhetoric  in  both the United States and Taiwan to the 
effect that the United States was somehow responsible for the “loss of China,” 
it appears to have been clear to Chiang Kai-shek that the most fundamental 
problem was the incompetence, lack of discipline, and corruption of  the ROC 
army and the KMT (Eastman 1984, chap. 9). It also appears to have been 
clear to Chiang Kai-shek that dramatic changes were necessary in the ROC 
and KMT institutions and policies  if they  were going to survive. Thus, in 
1948, Chiang Kai-shek entrusted the tasks of preparing  Taiwan politically, 
militarily, and economically to a trusted comrade (General Ch’en Ch’eng) and 
to his son (Chiang Ching-kuo).  Although these efforts continued to involve 
the ruthless suppression of political dissent, unlike the period from  1945 to 
1947, internal reform of political and party institutions was equally important. 
In broad outline, then, by 1950 the KMT had established itself on Taiwan, 
apparently with the genuine expectation of launching a counterattack on the 
now Communist-controlled Mainland. Ironically, the fact that the KMT had 
no organic relationships  to the political  structures of  Taiwan (such as they 
were after half  a century of Japanese rule combined with the recent KMT 
excesses) meant that it was now possible to implement the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic reforms that had been politically impossible on the mainland. 
Chiang  Kai-shek  implicitly  proposed  a  classic  state-building  gamble:  the 
external emergency would be used to justify direct repression of political dis- 
sent, while legitimacy was built on a foundation of rapid economic develop- 
ment. Absolutely essential to the success of this gamble was the transforma- 
tion  of  the  KMT  into  a  disciplined,  honest,  and  efficient instrument  of 
Chiang’s will. 
10. This repression was to have long-term consequences for the politics of  Taiwan  since a 
substantial proportion of  Taiwanese political activists were among the ten to twenty thousand 
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Perhaps the greatest irony of all was the indirect role of the PRC in bringing 
the U.S. government back as a major player in the political-economic devel- 
opment of Taiwan. The U.S. government had been a substantial supporter of 
the Nationalist war effort against Japan. With the end of the war, however, the 
continued commitment of the United States was in substantial doubt. Not only 
was it not clear whether  the United  States would  choose to pursue a hege- 
monic role in the postwar era or, following its historical traditions, revert to a 
more  isolationist  stance, but, even after that  battle had been  won by  what 
Yergin  (1977) calls the cold war realists, there was continuing  doubt about 
America’s commitment to the Nationalists. In fact, by 1949, the U.S. govern- 
ment had concluded that, short of a massive military effort on the part of  the 
United States, the KMT could not be saved. Furthermore, many believed that, 
as a result of internal corruption and incompetence, it was not worth saving. 
Finally, some members of the administration thought that a Chinese Commu- 
nist regime might eventually be a valuable ally against the Soviet Union and 
that continued support of the KMT would simply make such a strategy harder 
to realize.” As a result, by late  1949, the United States had decided not to 
reinstitute military aid and not to undertake a massive economic aid program, 
and it had secretly informed embassy officials to expect the fall of Taiwan. By 
the end of January  1950, both President Truman and Secretary of State Ache- 
son had publicly announced that the United States would not become militar- 
ily  involved  in the defense of  Taiwan.  All  this changed on 25 June, when 
North Korean troops invaded South Korea and any hope of  normalized rela- 
tions with the PRC ended when Chinese “volunteers” entered the conflict in 
November. 
The decision by the United States to support the KMT government on Tai- 
wan did nothing to change its dubious opinion of that government. As a result, 
the U.S. government sought to stiffen Chiang Kai-shek’s resolve with respect 
to both political and economic reforms. Given the large commitment of  eco- 
nomic and military  aid and the large number of  U.S. government personnel 
associated with that aid, the United States was a significant force for reform. 
It is important to recall, however, that, unlike, say, Vietnam, the ROC under 
Chiang Kai-shek appears to have been genuinely committed to reform. 
Thus, for a variety  of  historically  unique reasons, the government of  the 
ROC on Taiwan was able to adopt and implement economic (as well as social 
and  political) policy  relatively  free from direct pressure  by Taiwanese eco- 
nomic interest groups. The modifier relatively should be taken very seriously. 
The point is certainly not that corruption, incompetence and internal conflict 
disappeared overnight. The point is that, within the government, the external 
threat and the experiences of the preceding twenty or so years made it possible 
to impose the sort of internal discipline that had been lacking on the mainland. 
11. Barrett (1988) gives an excellent short account of  the various positions in the postwar U.S. 
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Similarly, in the relation  between the state and civil society, there were no 
effective elites outside the state: the rural elites had been eliminated in the land 
reform (1949-53);  Taiwanese industrial elites were few in number, tarred by 
their association  with the Japanese,  and dependent on the state; Taiwanese 
political elites had been either murdered or driven from political activity; and 
Chinese industrial elites had a long history of enmity toward the KMT, most 
having chosen not to follow the KMT to Taiwan but to relocate in Hong Kong 
and other overseas Chinese communities. As a result, there was an unusual 
degree of separation between the state and the civil society. With the exception 
of  the parts of the economy under the direct control of  the government, the 
military, and the party (a nontrivial part of  the economy), the links between 
the economy and the various parts of the state tended to be informal and based 
on personal  relationships  (Winckler  1981,  1987, 1988). Furthermore,  as  a 
result of  the genuine attempts to maintain internal discipline, these relation- 
ships, while  locally  significant, did  not dominate policy  in broad outlines 
(again, the state sector is an exception). 
11.2.3  State Autonomy and Trade Policy in the ROC on TaiwanI2 
The previous section argued that, as the result of  a unique conjuncture of 
domestic and international events, the government of the ROC  on Taiwan pos- 
sessed an unusually high level of autonomy that could be applied to economic 
policy. In this section we consider the particular case of international trade 
policy. As with most treatments, we will consider major stages in the devel- 
opment of Taiwan’s trade policy: first-stage import-substituting industrializa- 
tion (ISI); first-stage export-led growth (XLG); second-stage ISI; and second- 
stage XLG.  The following section will  then  consider the  effects of  recent 
political developments on the future directions of Taiwan’s trade policy. 
Taiwan’s  experience  with  import-substituting industrialization  was  clas- 
sic.I3 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Taiwanese economy was in a state 
of profound disequilibrium: hyperinflation, large trade deficits, a severe short- 
age of foreign exchange, an increase in population of nearly 30 percent, short- 
ages of  producer  and consumer goods,  and a devastated private and social 
physical plant. As part of the response to this disequilibrium, the government 
of the ROC  adopted the IS1 policy that was the standard policy recommenda- 
tion of the period:  strict licensing of  imports; multiple exchange rates; high 
tariffs; and discrimination in favor of  capital and intermediate good imports. 
12. Given the dramatic success of Taiwan’s trade and development policies, it is not surprising 
that these policies are well studied. Useful sources on the economics of trade and development in 
Taiwan are Ho (1978), Hou (1988), Hou and Chen (1989), Kuo and Wea (1988). Kuo (1983, pt. 
3), Kuo and  Fei (1985). Lee and Liang (1982), Li  (1988), Liang and Liang (1982, 1988), Lin 
(1973). Schive (1990), Scitovsky (1986), and Tsiang (1984). On  the politics and political econ- 
omy, see Chen (1990), Chu (1989); Deyo (1987), Gereffi (1990), Gold (1986), Haggard (1990, 
chap. 4), Koo (1987), and, esp., Wade (1990). 
13. Balassa (1980) gives an  excellent short account of the received version of trade and devel- 
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As with all programs of this sort, the existence of strong government controls 
and the rationing of scarce goods meant allocation on the grounds of political 
accommodation  and/or direct venality. Without denying the existence of  cor- 
ruption, the need of  the KMT to develop a new image (for both the Taiwanese 
civil society and the increasingly important U. S . aid establishment) restricted 
pure venality to relatively low levels. 
In this period, however, the ROC government did find it necessary for po- 
litical reasons  to accommodate two important  classes  of  person.  The most 
important class was the 1-2  million Mainlanders (both military and civilian) 
that followed Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT to Taiwan. In addition to a dra- 
matic expansion in the state apparatus per se, the ROC government absorbed 
a large number of Mainlanders in the stateiparty-owned enterprise sector (ac- 
counting for 50 percent of industrial production) and granted privileged access 
to the main IS1 sectors (especially textiles). The other, much smaller group was 
the large landlords and comprador capitalists of the Japanese colonial era. The 
small number of these that were willing and able to form some relationships 
with the KMT state tended to gravitate to the four previously  Japanese state 
enterprises whose shares had been allocated to landlords in partial compensa- 
tion during the third stage of the land reform (“land to the tiller”).I4 
A couple of patterns characteristic of the Taiwanese political economy were 
emerging even  at this  early stage. First,  the weak political  organization  of 
economic  interests  permitted  government  officials and technocrats  to domi- 
nate the policy process. Even potentially powerful groups (e.g., the Chinese 
military  and Taiwanese landlords and capitalists)  were related  to the KMT 
state in a clearly subordinate way. Second, large-scale firms, both state owned 
and new or newly private, tended to be oriented to the local market. In addi- 
tion to using these firms for political purposes, state planners sought to main- 
tain control of sectors with significant linkage effects. 
By the late 1950s, first-stage IS1 entered a textbook crisis characterized by 
excess capacity in the main import-substitution sectors due to saturation of the 
small protected  domestic market, a severe foreign exchange shortage due to 
the  disincentives  to export, and continuing  balance-of-payments  problems. 
Although  the ROC government  had pursued  some export promotion  in the 
context of  its overall strategy of ISI, the end of the “easy” period of IS1 led to 
a fundamental reorientation of strategy toward XLG. In addition to simplify- 
ing the exchange rate system, a variety of export-promotion  measures were 
adopted, including subsidized credit for exporters; the liberalization of import 
restrictions for inputs to the export-producing sectors; a variety of tax exemp- 
tions and rebates granted to export production; the provision of information 
on foreign markets (thus reducing the transaction costs of exporting); and the 
liberalization of the foreign investment environment, permitting a wide range 
14. The four state-owned firms were Taiwan Cement, Taiwan Agricultural and Forestry Prod- 
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of  relationships  between  foreign  (especially  Japanese  and  U.S.)  and  Tai- 
wanese firms engaged in production for export.I5  Like many XLG programs, 
however, the policy thrust was clearly toward export promotion, not general 
liberalization of the import control regime.  I6 Tariffs and other controls on con- 
sumer goods remained high (in fact, many tariffs were increased for revenue 
reasons),  while  government  policy  continued  to  protect  state-  and  KMT- 
owned enterprises from domestic and foreign competition. 
Compared  with  export-promotion  programs  in many  countries,  the  most 
notable aspect of the Taiwanese program was the relatively strong reliance on 
general promotion schemes (as opposed to firm and sector targeting). By cre- 
ating a mechanism that was sensitive to market signals, Taiwan’s export pro- 
motion schemes tended to select for global comparative advantage. The re- 
sults were clear and dramatic. Where exports grew by 4.4 percent during the 
period of IS1 (1952-60),  the growth rate of  exports was 25.3 percent  from 
1961 to  1970 and 27.1 percent from 1971 to 1981 (Kuo and Fei 1985). Per- 
haps more significant, on the basis of input-output data Kuo and Fei estimate 
that export expansion’s contribution to the expansion of total output was 22.5 
percent  in  1956-61,  35 percent in  1961-66,  45.9 percent  in  1966-71,  and 
67.7 percent in 1971-76. 
As comparative research on the evolution of trade and development strate- 
gies suggests, the end of first-stage IS1 need not have resulted in either liber- 
alization or XLG. In Taiwan, the crisis of first-stage IS1 generated substantial 
support for  a package  of  policies  that would  stabilize the existing  import- 
substitution  sectors while moving directly to second-stage ISI. Particularly 
prominent among the policies suggested were the creation of government car- 
tels and the identification  and promotion of  second-stage import-substitution 
sectors. The potential members of the coalition supporting some form of con- 
tinued commitment  to state-led IS1  constitute an impressive list: many state 
technocrats charged with financial and banking policy were concerned about 
the effects of liberalization on price  stability; managers  and workers  in the 
state/party sector were worried about the effect of reforms (there was talk of 
privatization among reformers); the military was committed to a fairly strong 
form of  self-sufficiency;  and, finally,  some KMT  leaders  were  concerned 
about the effects of liberalization on the creation of a Taiwanese (as opposed 
to Mainlander) business class, and some were worried about the creation of 
an independent capitalist class of any kind. These are precisely the groups that 
rent-seeking/endogenous  policy theory suggests should dominate the policy- 
making process: they had concentrated benefits from resisting the policy, and 
they  were already well organized within the state apparatus. Not  only were 
15. The major government programs implementing the XLG program were the Regulations for 
the Rebate of  Taxes on Export Products (1955), the Program for the Improvement of  Foreign- 
Exchange and Trade Control (1958), and the Statute for the Encouragement of Investment (1960). 
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the gainers  from  the  switch to XLG  diffused,  but they  were  also virtually 
excluded from the political system. 
The decision by the government of  the ROC on Taiwan to respond to the 
crisis of  IS1 by a switch to XLG can be understood  only in terms of  ruison 
de‘tat, both domestic and international.’’ It will be recalled that part of  the 
strategy of the KMT on Taiwan was to develop political legitimacy via a pol- 
icy  of  economic  growth  with political  exclusion.  When  we recall  that the 
highly concentrated power structure of the state makes persuasion potentially 
effective in struggles over policy, the notion that the intellectual arguments for 
export orientation and liberalization dominated those in favor of IS1 deepen- 
ing as a means of growth maximization seems quite plausible.’* At the same 
time, U.S. representatives were promoting both XLG and expansion of  the 
economic role of Taiwanese nationals. This was a nontrivial consideration in 
a period  when  U.S. military might was protecting Taiwan from a bellicose 
PRC and U.S. aid was funding both projects and macroeconomic imbalances. 
Furthermore, even if Chiang Kai-shek and his intimates had already decided 
to pursue XLG, US.  preferences for that policy could be used to restrain the 
proponents of IS1 deepening (especially the military). 
In the event, as we have already noted, the policy was something of a com- 
promise between IS1 deepening and generalized liberalization. The structural 
features we identified with respect to the IS1 policy are even clearer after the 
adoption  of  the  XLG  policy.  Continued  support/protection  of  import- 
substitution  sectors  meant  large  (especially  state-  and  party-owned)  firms 
serving the domestic market for consumer and intermediate goods. This sup- 
port reflected not only a continuing need to provide a livelihood for Mainlan- 
ders who had followed Chiang Kai-shek in retreat but also a continuing belief 
in the need to control certain “strategic” sectors. On the other hand, the use of 
general instruments with relatively small industrial targeting meant expansion 
of small, Taiwanese-owned firms in the export sector. This reflects the second 
point,  that the  major beneficiaries of the XLG program were not the more 
effectively  organized  groups (Mainlanders  and  compradors)  but  local  Tai- 
wanese. This is consistent with a state-building view of policy, but not with a 
mechanical “rent-seeking’’ view. 
By  the  early  1970s, the  international  political-economic  environment  of 
Taiwan’s  XLG  policy  was  becoming  increasingly  uncertain:  protectionism 
17. We  have already explained the state’s capacity to take independent action in terms of the 
external and internal threats to KMT hegemony over the Taiwanese political system. These threats 
were used to justify a highly centralized power structure with tight discipline over the incumbents 
of  both state and party positions and the application of tight control on the political activity of 
Taiwanese civil society. The issue here is why the individuals controlling the state (i.e., Chiang 
Kai-shek and his closest colleagues) chose to use this capacity for independent action to pursue 
XLG instead of IS1 “deepening.” 
18. For the argument that intellectual persuasion was significant in this policy decision, see, 
among others, Haggard (1990) and Chen (1990). If this argument is accepted, the role of S. C. 
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seemed to be on the rise in major export markets, as was actual protection; a 
second generation of newly industrialized countries (NICs) was beginning to 
compete for the same export markets; oil and  other commodity  prices that 
were inputs to Taiwan’s production process rose dramatically; Taiwan was ex- 
pelled from the United Nations in 197  1 ;  major-trading-partner Japan derecog- 
nized Taiwan in 1972; and improved relations between the United States and 
the PRC made Taiwan’s “special relationship”  with the United States appear 
increasingly uncertain. On the home front, the very success of the XLG policy 
tended to undermine comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactures 
via its labor-market effects. In this situation, the government of the ROC on 
Taiwan opted for a period of second-stage IST, including the expansion of state 
investment in both infrastructure and key intermediate  product^,'^ a brief flir- 
tation  with  industrial  rationalization  and domestic content  schemes for the 
automobile sector, and some attempts to micromanage the tariff structure and 
the foreign exchange market. 
Once again, this decision is difficult to understand from a social demand 
point of view. By comparison with the previous period, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the proponents of IS1 had grown relatively weaker.  On the one 
hand, economic development and the passage of time were reducing the need 
for policies  to ease the adjustment  of  Mainlanders  to life on Taiwan.  With 
respect to the military, while the diplomatic situation was uncertain,  it is dif- 
ficult to conceive of the PRC in the 1970s as a greater military threat than at 
the beginning of  the previous period, when the U.S.  navy was necessary to 
forestall an imminent invasion.  On the other hand, the dramatic increase in 
the export sector should surely have  increased  the stake of  that  sector in a 
continuation of the policy of XLG. Nonetheless, diplomatic isolation and (the 
risk of) economic isolation appear to have been sufficient to induce the gov- 
ernment to adopt  the  second-stage IS1  policies  characteristic  of  the  other 
small, semiopen “pariah” states: Israel and South Africa. 
11.2.4  Domestic Political Liberalization and the Politicization of 
Trade Policy 
To this point we have argued that the central fact in the political economy 
of  Taiwanese trade policy was the capacity of the ROC/KMT state to act in- 
dependently of political pressure from Taiwanese civil society. The very gen- 
uine state of emergency permitted the KMT leadership to maintain discipline 
within  the  state/party  apparatus and to restrict  the political  activity of  Tai- 
wanese civil society. Furthermore, the KMT state chose to use its autonomy 
to override effectively organized interests seeking broadly protectionist trade 
and development policies. The most recent phase in the political economy of 
trade and development policy is ushered in by a devastating external shock in 
19. This involved heavy state involvement in petrochemicals as well as the creation of  large, 
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the context of fundamental change in the domestic political environment. The 
shock, of  course, was derecognition  by the United  States on 15 December 
1978. In this section, we  consider  the effects of  the current trends toward 
political liberalization on the future of Taiwan’s trade policy. 
The domestic political  implications of  derecognition  in Taiwan were pro- 
found, not so much because of any increased risk of aggression by the PRC or 
even of a dramatic worsening of relations with the United States,2o  but because 
of  the politicizing effect of the change on Taiwanese civil society. It has been 
suggested that Taiwanese civil society in general, and business in particular, 
drew three important lessons from derecognition: “We can’t trust the United 
States, we can’t trust the government, so we must ‘trust ourselves.’ ”21 That 
is, there was a perceived  need for direct, self-interested,  collective political 
action by  economic (as well  as other)  interest groups. This realization  oc- 
curred in an environment of  increasing  liberalization  both  within  the KMT 
and in Taiwanese civil society.22 
The initial implication of the politicization of those parts of Taiwanese busi- 
ness that had not been previously directly organized by the state (i.e., primar- 
ily the Taiwanese nationals involved in exporting) in the context of  a political 
opening was a move back toward export orientation. Specifically, the govern- 
ment of  the ROC pursued a more substantial liberalization of the trade control 
regime (especially tariffs and licensing); a liberalization of  exchange controls, 
considerably  easing the process  of  foreign direct  investment by  Taiwanese 
firms; and a substantial financial liberalization.  This outcome begins to look 
very much like demand-based politics of  the familiar sort: Taiwanese export 
interests become organized and active, while the state/party-connected sectors 
are still frozen by the centralized state/party structure. 
The end of martial law (1987), the death of Chiang Ching-kuo (13 January 
1988) without a clearly dominant successor, and the end of  the state of emer- 
gency all imply the emergence of  genuinely competitive politics in Taiwan. 
At the same time, the conditions that gave rise to the dramatic separation of 
the Mainlander-dominated government from Taiwanese civil society have also 
substantially eroded: increasing numbers of native Taiwanese have entered the 
highest levels of the state (including, of course, the presidency); in addition, 
with the passage  of time, native Taiwanese have developed closer relations 
with the KMT government; and most Mainlanders, especially of younger gen- 
20. It is important to recall that it took Congress less than a week to pass the Taiwan Relations 
Act (1 January 1979), maintaining in existence all treaties between the United States and the ROC 
and ensuring continued equal treatment of the ROC under all relevant law. 
21, Any residual hope that the election of a president from the right wing of the Republican 
party (traditional supporters of the Nationalist government as part of its strong anti-Communist, 
Asia-oriented foreign policy) would improve matters was quickly dashed by Reagan administra- 
tion decisions not to export advanced military hardware to Taiwan. 
22. For useful treatments of political liberalization in Taiwan, see Chen (1989), Tien (1989), 
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erations, have adjusted to being, at least geographically, Taiwanese.23  This has 
meant that it is increasingly difficult to maintain the kind of internal discipline 
within the state that characterized the Emergency years. 
At least as important as the decrease in internal discipline, however, is the 
increase in competitive politics. Given the continuing differences in the con- 
centrations of Mainlanders and native Taiwanese in import-substitution versus 
export-orientation  sectors, this  suggests that the politics of  trade and devel- 
opment policy could become embroiled in communal politics. In the context 
of increasingly competitive politics, the development of  multiparty  competi- 
tion  and  increased  participation  of  the  legislative  Yuan  in the  trade  policy 
process becomes quite significant. Without a strongman at the top of the polit- 
ical hierarchy to manage the system, and with increasingly organized and ac- 
tive interest groups, the capacity of the state to control trade policy is substan- 
tially  reduced.  While  the export  interests are better organized now  than  at 
previous points in the modem history of Taiwan, they will increasingly face 
political competition  from the  well-organized import-substitution sector. As 
in all competitive political  systems, competition for office is costly and tends 
to breed close relations between suppliers of campaign finance and interests 
with money to give. The legislative Yuan is already becoming more active on 
trade policy issues. 
Perhaps the safest conclusion is that, as with the United States, trade policy 
in Taiwan will become increasingly dominated by the politics of  special inter- 
ests, more prone to large and unpredictable changes, and more prone to polit- 
ically driven protectionism reflecting the inherent biases in the politics of pro- 
tection. At a time when Taiwan has a massive trade surplus in its major export 
market,  this certainly  suggests the potential  for increasing  conflict between 
the United  States and Taiwan. As a response to this, the government  of  the 
ROC is pursuing a two-track strategy. The first track is an attempt to diversify 
export markets,  especially with respect to Europe and the oil-exporting na- 
tions. The second track is the attempt to gain admission to the GATT. In an 
increasingly uncertain political-economic environment,  the GATT is seen as 
some insurance for a country that relies extensively on trade. As part of  this 
strategy, the most recent trend in Taiwan’s trade policy is a move toward gen- 
uine liberalization: reduction of  tariffs; dismantling of licensing schemes; and 
adoption  of  GATT-compatible  domestic  regulations.  The  stability  of  this 
strategy in the face of increasingly competitive politics is an interesting ques- 
tion. 
23. The last of these should not be taken to mean that the distinction between Mainlander and 
native Taiwanese has lost political significance. In fact, with the realization that Mainlanders will 
not be going back to the mainland, both sides have recognized that their political struggles are of 
a longer-run  sort. Furthermore, because these two groups have, to this point,  been  organized 
(politically and economically) in different ways, this suggests the possibility of increased com- 
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11.3  Conclusions 
The United States and the Republic of China are paradigm cases of different 
types of trade liberalization (the United States as a hegemonic leader and the 
ROC as a peripheral or semiperipheral client). We have argued that, in both 
cases, the successful implementation of such a policy rested, at least in part, 
on historically unusual degrees of state autonomy from direct social pressure. 
This should not be a surprising conclusion. A fundamental part of the standard 
account of the political economy of protection is the asymmetry of protection- 
seeking forces vis-8-vis liberalization-seeking forces. While this balance may 
change  at the  margin,  the  underlying  asymmetry  is  unlikely  to  change.24 
Thus, the discontinuous  shift to liberalization in both the United  States and 
the ROC must be accounted for, at least in part, by something outside simple 
pressure politics.  An argument of  this sort requires an answer to two ques- 
tions: How did the state develop substantial autonomy with respect  to trade 
policy (an area that had not been characterized by such autonomy in the past 
in either country)? Why did it choose to apply its autonomy to liberalization? 
We have focused primarily on the first question in this paper because it seems 
to be logically prior, but the second question is also of considerable signifi- 
cance. After all, a number of  countries have experienced crises producing  a 
substantial,  if  not quite equal, level of  state autonomy without generating a 
commitment of  liberalization (an obvious hegemonic example is the Soviet 
Union in the cold war era, while Tanzania and Ghana in the postindependence 
era are examples of  peripheral states). An answer to the second question  is 
well beyond the limits of this paper but would seem to be a research question 
of considerable importance. 
A question of more immediate policy importance is raised by the argument 
developed in the paper. If liberalization rests on a political foundation of state 
autonomy, what happens when that base is eroded? In both the United States 
and the ROC, the emergence of  increasingly democratic politics in the insti- 
tutions controlling trade policy suggests, at a minimum, that trade policy will 
become decreasingly predictable in the future. In  both countries,  politicians 
have begun to recognize  that international trade and competition are potent 
public political issues. This has reopened trade as a public issue in a way that 
we have not seen for nearly half a century. Whether we are interested in the 
positive or the normative implications of  these changes, it  seems clear to us 
that we will not make much progress until we begin a more serious, system- 
atic study of the “supply side” of the political market and the way in which it 
interacts with demand. 
24. Nelson (1989)  develops this argument in detail for the case of U.S.  trade policy since 1930. 331  Political Economy of U.S .-Taiwanese Trade 
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Comment  Koichi Hamada 
This paper is a lucid, systematic account of  political economy on both sides 
of the Pacific-in  the United States and the Republic of  China (ROC). Meth- 
odologically, the study of  the supply side of  public goods is as important as 
the demand side. Just to say that the state is the supply side is oversimplistic. 
Political entrepreneurship, leadership, and exploitation should be explicitly 
analyzed. Also, one should not neglect the intricate structure of trade conflicts 
Koichi Hamada is professor of economics at Yale University  and a research associate of  the 
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because trade conflicts can be regarded as a layer of games at both the inter- 
national and the domestic levels. As Robert Putnam emphasizes (see Putnam 
and  Bayne  1987), international  economics can  be  analyzed  as a  two-level 
game. The interaction between international conflict and domestic conflict is 
tighter in trade disputes than in the macroeconomic coordination attempts that 
he focuses on because  losers and winners in trade disputes are quite distinct 
groups  of  people. As  illustrated  in  figure  11C.  1, the game of  trade  issues 
between the United States and the ROC is of the two-level type, level 1 being 
international negotiations  between  representatives and level 2 domestic eco- 
nomic conflicts between groups within a country. Export industries in a coun- 
try  share the same interests  with consumers in the other country.  Since the 
countervailing power of consumers is weak, the outcome of the political inter- 
play of domestic producer interests is often a protectionistic world trade re- 
gime. 
Let us look at the game at the international level. When the United States 
held full hegemony over the world, it could serve as a leader in multilateral 
worldwide decisions relying on the rule of  established international organiza- 
tions. However, with its declining hegemony-the  United States in the Gulf 
War  was like samurai (warriors), who had military authority and leadership 
but no economic power during the late Edo period before the Meiji Restora- 
tion, and Japan was like chonin (merchants), who had money but no leader- 
ship-the  United  States cannot  afford  to  rely  exclusively  on a multilateral 
approach. Thus, the bilateral approach to VERs (voluntary import restraints) 
or OMAs (orderly marketing agreements) as well as the regional approach to 
the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) came to the surface. 
At the domestic level,  the description  of  the power balance between  the 
U.S. Congress and the president  is illuminating.  I  understand that the U.S. 
Constitution sets a stage for the balance-of-power game between the legisla- 
tive branch and the executive branch.  This political structure gives the U.S. 
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Relative Cost 
Less Competitive  More Competitive 
Given Factor Prices and Exchange Rate 
Fig. llC.2  IS1 vs. XLG policy 
will retaliate  unless  the partner accepts  U.S. proposals, and it allows U.S. 
trade policy to be free of foreign pressure. 
For Taiwan, I have two questions. The first is, Why did the corrupt KMT 
turn into a rather disciplined, honest institution? Incidentally,  the success of 
the power elite in civil society  reminds  me of  the  success  of  occupational 
reform by  the  supreme commander of  the Allied power  in  the  Occupation 
period in postwar Japan. The second is, Given the fact that the government 
cannot subsidize all industries, how can you draw the line between IS1 (im- 
port-substituting  industrialization)  policy and XLG  (export-led growth) pol- 
icy? Figure  llC.2  ranks on the  horizontal  axis the relative competence  of 
industries in the fashion that the Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson version of the 
Ricardo model would indicate. IS1 policy protects the least competent or in- 
competent in the future. XLG policy is to subsidize the most competent or the 
most promising  in the future. With limited resources,  the government must 
choose some pattern of protection or subsidization. I wonder if there is some 
optimal pattern  for conducting this and  if indeed the ROC followed  such a 
policy. 
Reference 
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Comment  Richard H. Snape 
I found this paper very instructive on the course of Taiwan’s trade policy and 
on U.  S.  -Taiwan relations. 
The paper opens with  an emphasis  on the “supply” of  trade policies,  as 
distinct from demand, and argues that the role of the state (politicians, bureau- 
crats, etc.) in supplying trade policies that address collective goals has been 
ignored in political economy models. I think that there could be more consid- 
eration of this supply of collective goals and their relation to demand. Presum- 
ably, these collective goods are demanded by the electorate in some manner- 
voters, funders, and lobby groups certainly include defense and, in the United 
States and  Taiwan,  anti-Communism  in their demands.  Politicians  seeking 
legitimacy and hence retention of their positions can lead, follow, or anticipate 
public opinion. Following opinion is obviously responding to demand. Lead- 
ing  or anticipating  is  also demand  oriented,  although to future rather  than 
present demand-just  like any product innovator. A product innovator hopes 
to convert people to his product-if  he does not get the demand, he fails; a 
visionary politician hopes to convert people to his vision-if  he does not get 
the demand, he fails. In some situations, demanders may be the military rather 
than the voters. 
In describing  and analyzing U.S.  policy, four key changes are identified: 
(1) a shift to “fair” trade (about 1970); (2) greater use of unilateral/bilateral/ 
plurilateral  policies  (I  982);  (3) discriminatory  nontariff  barriers  (from  the 
early 1960s but momentum in late 1970s and the  1980s); and (4) the greater 
role of Congress (from 1974).  This list is generated by a focus on manufactur- 
ing industry. If agriculture were to be included, things would look a bit differ- 
ent. The first point-fair  trade-would  remain. With respect to points 2 and 
3, unilateral and bilateral policies and plurilateral restrictive agreements came 
much earlier. At the insistence of the United States, the original GATT con- 
tained  provisions  for import  quotas  when  there  was  domestic  agricultural 
price  support  combined  with  production  limitations-as  in  the  postwar 
United States. In the  1950s, there was the GATT waiver for many U.S. agri- 
cultural products, and sugar quotas, for example, clearly discriminated among 
suppliers on foreign policy grounds. Finally, on the fourth point, the role of 
Congress in trade policy, Congress was right in there from  1951 at least. An 
amendment of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of  195  1 provided that “no 
trade  agreement  . . . shall be applied in a manner inconsistent with the re- 
quirements of this section,” those requirements in fact being inconsistent with 
GATT (Gardner 1980, 375;  Dam 1970, 260). Thus, the focus could be broad- 
ened to include agriculture in the story, even though it is not particularly rele- 
vant to Taiwan as such, and one could then see how the story with agriculture 
included meets the hypotheses. 
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On the switch of  responsibility  for countervailing duty and anti-dumping 
from Treasury to Commerce, I would suggest that it is not just that Treasury 
deals with international finance but rather that Treasury has an overview role 
with a general constituency, whereas Commerce is a client department with a 
specific constituency. 
There is one irony in the paper that perhaps should not be passed unnoticed 
in view of Ken Flamm’s paper. The United States targeted Taiwan for using 
“constructed values” for calculating import tariffs, just when it was using con- 
structed  values  for antidumping purposes  for semiconductors.  Also,  it  was 
less than a decade after the United States had, in the Tokyo Round, been in- 
duced to give up the American selling price as a basis for duty calculation and 
the highly protective “wine gallon.” 
It would be instructive to compare changes in Taiwan’s policy in the 1970s, 
and indeed all the time after 1960, with Korea’s. Taiwan adopted the “second” 
import-substitution  policy  at about the same time as Korea implemented its 
heavy and chemical industry policy and abandoned it at about the same time 
as Korea switched back to less discriminatory support. It would be interesting 
to see whether the changes were related. 
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